Search results for "Principal–agent problem"
showing 10 items of 39 documents
The magnitude of a product recall: offshore outsourcing vs. captive offshoring effects
2018
The escalation in product recalls in recent years is attributed to the rise of globalisation and associated challenges of offshoring. Extant SCM research suggests that product recalls have a significant negative impact on financial performance, but gaps exist relative to the managerial actions to minimise their impact. Recall response strategies have become more important in the press, given that a single recall may result in the mandatory withdrawal of millions of products from the market, with firms incurring enormous logistics costs and brand damage. In this study, we address this gap in the research, and using a measure of product recall defined as the volume of products withdrawn from …
Unveiling the Role of Multiple blockholders: Evidence from Closely Held Firms.
2019
Research Question/Issue. This paper disentangles how the modes of ownership distribution among multiple blockholders and their heterogeneity shape principal–principal conflicts and, in turn, affect firm performance. The paper offers empirical evidence from a panel of Italian closely held firms over the period 2009–2014. Research Findings/Insights. We explore the principal–principal conflicts among blockholders across two distinct control structures. When a single blockholder controls the firm, principal–principal conflicts are shaped by the trade‐off between the alignment effect and the monitoring effect. In this scenario, we find that the relationship between the two largest blockholders' …
Prevention of occupational injuries: moral hazard and complex agency relationships
2004
This paper exploits the results of agency theory with the aim of contributing a new viewpoint and a form for analysis of the current functioning of the occupational injury and disease section of the French Social Security system in its mission of providing incentives for prevention. After outlining the organization and specific features of insurance against occupational risks, an initial level of analysis highlights the presence of moral hazard in relations between insurer and company and between company and employee. A second level of analysis with the appeal to complex agency relationship models, multitask model and third-party model, is necessary to take into account the consequences for…
Unveiling the Antecedents of International Diversification: An Agency Theory Approach
2014
While various studies have developed hypotheses about the antecedents of international diversification drawing mainly on the resource-based view, the behavioral theory of the firm, and the transaction costs literature, we advance our understanding by investigating the explanatory power of agency costs of free cash flow arguments. Using a sample panel of 167 Italian firms longitudinally evaluated during the 1980-2010 period, this study tests whether the firm’s choice to spread operations in multiple foreign countries is conditioned by excess of free cash flow and debt, especially in firm-contexts where agency problems are exacerbated by managers or large shareholders’ opportunism. We find th…
Director Compensation Incentives and Acquisition Outcomes
2018
The principal objective of this chapter is to investigate the relation between director compensation structure and shareholder interests in the context of acquisitions. Our evidence suggests that acquirer firms that compensate their directors with a higher proportion of incentive-based compensation have significantly higher stock returns around the announcement. An increase in director equity-based pay results in a lower probability of value-destroying acquisitions and a lower acquisition premium for targets. We further find that acquirers with higher equity-based pay exhibit greater improvements in stock price and operating performance following acquisitions.
Corporate governance and firm performance: A comparative analysis of auditing problems
2006
The recent financial crises have created a new debate about comparison and convergence of different systems of corporate governance. In particular, they have underlined poor efficiency of rule structures to achieve a good relationship between different stakeholder’s rights. In line with many studies of corporate governance that emphasize the manager-stakeholders relationship as explained by agency theory, in this paper, I analyse the role of auditing as an incentive device to reduce contractual or transaction costs related to asymmetric information.Considering as a benchmark the recent US Sarbanes Oxley Act of July 2002. I describe a set of auditing principles by comparing common and civil …
Selection by committee: Anonymity and gratitude
2018
Abstract What kind of candidate is selected into a job when the principal has to appoint a committee to measure the candidates’ ability and select a winner? We find that if the committee takes into account the candidate’s gratitude towards them, a candidate with less than first best ability will be selected. A relevant exception may occur if the first best is the overall best candidate. First best selection is always achieved if the committee is anonymous to the candidates. If the committee is not detached enough from the candidates then delegation fares even worse than random selection.
Influence of board of directors on firm performance: Analysis of family and non-family firms
2015
This article analyses how board structure can affect both financial and social performance, comparing family and non-family firms. Our theoretical framework is based on the integration of the agency theory, traditionally used in the analysis of the impact of the board on the firm's financial performance, with the stakeholder theory, which is more appropriate in the analysis of the social aspects of the firm. Three main aspects are addressed: the analysis of the firm's social performance; the integration of agency theory with stakeholder theory; and the study of the specific characteristics of family firms' boards. The research confirms that neither the agency theory nor the stakeholder theo…
Commitment of independent and institutional women directors to corporate social responsibility reporting
2018
This paper examines how independent and institutional women directors on boards affect corporate social responsibility (hereafter CSR) reporting. Most of the previous empirical evidence has shown a linear association between female directors and CSR disclosure, but to the best of our knowledge, no research has investigated the individual effect of independent and institutional female directors on CSR reporting. Therefore, the analysis of how the disclosure of CSR information is affected by independent and institutional women directors in a separate way merits our attention. Thus, we posit that there is a nonlinear association, concretely quadratic, between independent and institutional fema…
Globalization of Monitoring Practices: The Case of American Influences on the Dismissal Risk of European CEOs
2013
Accepted version of an article from the Journal of Economics and Business This study examines globalization of monitoring practices by focusing on how American (U.S.) influences on European firms impact the dismissal risk for these firms' CEOs. Specifically, we argue that the stronger short term orientation of the American corporate governance system increase the dismissal performance sensitivity faced by European CEOs, indirectly and directly. The former materializes via European firms cross-listing on U.S. exchanges, the latter results from European firms hiring U.S. independent board members. Both influences are expected to result in increased dismissal performance sensitivity. Based on …